Modifying serialized objects смотреть онлайн

When tampering with the data, as long as the attacker preserves a valid serialized object, the deserialization process will create a server-side object with the modified attribute values.

As a simple example, consider a website that uses a serialized User object to store data about a user's session in a cookie. If an attacker spotted this serialized object in an HTTP request, they might decode it to find the following byte stream:

O:4:"User":2:{s:8:"username";s:6:"carlos";s:7:"isAdmin";b:0;}

The isAdmin attribute is an obvious point of interest. An attacker could simply change the boolean value of the attribute to 1 (true), re-encode the object, and overwrite their current cookie with this modified value. In isolation, this has no effect. However, let's say the website uses this cookie to check whether the current user has access to certain administrative functionality:

$user = unserialize($_COOKIE);
if ($user-isAdmin === true) {
// allow access to admin interface
}

This vulnerable code would instantiate a User object based on the data from the cookie, including the attacker-modified isAdmin attribute. At no point is the authenticity of the serialized object checked. This data is then passed into the conditional statement and, in this case, would allow for an easy privilege escalation.